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Color-blind theory has proven to be the main tribute inequal-
ity pays to the principle of equality in our national life. At the na-
tion's founding, the assertion that "all men are created equal" was
used to justify establishment of a regime in which enslavement of
the black population was given constitutional sanction.' In 1857 the
Supreme Court managed to harmonize the principle of equality of
all citizens with the continued existence of slavery by simply de-
claring that black persons are not citizens.2 In 1896 the Supreme
Court placed its imprimatur on a ghastly system of apartheid, but
in doing so, felt it necessary to declare the policy "separate but
equal. 13 It is a tribute to the American ideal of equality that the
High Court was driven to lie rather than to admit what it was
doing.'
Today, many decry affirmative attempts to remedy the contin-
ued social and economic deprivation of blacks and other minority
group members. Once again, people tip their hats in tribute to the
principle of equality and insist that their sole object is to ensure
that everyone is treated equally without regard to race. I suggest
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Slavery was not merely permitted under the original Constitution; it was protected.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive-slave clause).
2 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Lest there be any doubt that "separate but equal" was a wholly inaccurate description
of the post-Plessy practice, see Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528
(1899) (Board of Education allowed to close black high school for economic reasons, even
though black students not admitted to white high school).
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that this version of equality, which permits the continuation, in-
deed the exacerbation, of grave disparities in the opportunities and
advantages Available to persons of different races, ignores the con-
text in which the problem of inequality has persisted in this coun-
try, and ultimately endangers our democratic institutions.
I do not suggest that everyone who opposes affirmative action
on behalf of persons of disadvantaged background5 is motivated by
racism or ill will. Quite the contrary: many are sincere and idealis-
tic. Moreover, it is easy to understand the distaste many feel for
programs that allocate burdens or benefits on the basis of race.
Nevertheless, I believe that such persons focus too narrowly on the
importance of formally neutral rules, and thereby inhibit achieve-
ment of the equality necessary to our political system. No one can
deny that race is, and has always been, the most serious, the most
divisive, and the most persistent problem in the United States. To
paraphrase-and I believe to correct-Professor Alexander Bickel's
famous statement: the lesson of race relations in this country has
been the same since the Founding; inequality between the races is
"illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destruc-
tive of democratic society."' If we come to understand why this is
so, then it may become more clear what we must do about it.
I
Equality and egalitarian justice have animated political move-
ments in countries around the globe through much of recent his-
tory. Yet nowhere is the principle of equality so central to the
proper functioning of the political system as it is in the United
States. This is partly the product of historical and geographical cir-
cumstance: the United States-more than most nations-
comprises a profusion of races and ethnic groups. It is not sur-
prising that racial equality is a vital issue to so heterogeneous a
- For purposes of this essay, I will write primarily about black Americans. To a large
extent, however, the black race is a paradigm for other disadvantaged groups. This analysis
should be understood as applying to those other groups as well, except where the context
indicates otherwise.
I Professor Bickel's actual words were: "The lesson of the great decisions of the Su-
preme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a gener-
ation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently
wrong, and destructive of democratic society." A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133
(1975). This statement has recently provided the inspiration for a sharp attack on affirma-
tive action programs. Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 775 (1979).
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people. But in saying that racial equality is central to our political
institutions, I am referring not to historical happenstance, but
rather to political theory and practice.
People often assert that equality is antithetical to liberty, and
that promotion of equality is antidemocratic. Properly understood,
these concepts are in harmony. This understanding is best cap-
tured by the ideal of self-rule, by which I mean a system of govern-
ment in which a large measure of control is vested in each citizen
over his own life, and in which social control is exercised with the
consent of, and through the representatives of, the citizens. Equal-
ity, far from being antithetical to this understanding of liberty, is
indispensable to it. The essential equality of the citizens is a fun-
damental precondition to the operation of the liberal democratic
regime as established in this country.
The genius of the American system has been to mold out of the
conflicting private interests of its individual citizens a common n-
terest of the community. The system requires a particular type of
citizen, and it emphasizes a particular type of interest. The citizen
must have a stake in his country: he must feel that his country's
prosperity is his prosperity, that his country's woe ,is his woe. Un-
less he feels this bond of community, he will-no matter what his
legal status-consider himself an alien in his own land. Moreover,
the individual citizens must pursue interests that are flexible and
open to compromise, lest they be unable to reach mutually advan-
tageous agreements with citizens who have conflicting interests.
Thus, our politics must be based upon the shifting alliances of eco-
nomic and social interest, rather than the immutable and uncom-
promising lines of race, clan, or religion. With respect to each of
these requirements, racial inequality destroys the operation of the
political system.
How can we expect blacks and other members of disadvan-
taged minority groups to feel they have a stake in the present sys-
tem? They are denied the fruits of the nation's bounty. They are
crowded together in the nation's slums; they suffer widespread un-
employment; they receive the worst of most social services; they
bear the brunt of the nation's brutalities. As they survey our white
legislatures and congresses, our white courtrooms and bureaucra-
cies, must they not feel that their citizenship is second-rate-that,
no matter what the Constitution may say about their equality as
citizens, they are unequal and ruled from above? And if this objec-
tive inequality undermines the bonds of community felt by black
Americans, the fact that it was the deliberate product of oppression
19791
The University of Chicago Law Review
by the white majority should make white Americans marvel at the
continued patience and patriotism of their black countrymen.
Plainly, the disadvantaged position of blacks and members of other
minority groups is a structural flaw in our political system, and an
abomination.
Moreover, so long as the disadvantaged groups of the United
States remain outside of the mainstream of our social and eco-
nomic life, they will be driven to the very race-based politics feared
by many opponents of affirmative action.7 A poor black man will
often vote for black candidates espousing black causes, just as any
other citizen may sometimes vote on the basis of racial or ethnic
identity. But unlike his more prosperous fellow citizens, whose eth-
nic identity is diluted and usually overwhelmed by interests
grounded in economic or other concerns, the poor black man often
has no faction to support other than one based on race. Because he
plays no other role in the economy or society, he has no conflicting
allegiance. Hence, affirmative action may be the only way to dis-
mantle racial politics in the long run. Only when the divisions of
race and ethnicity cease to correspond, and begin to conflict, with
divisions along economic, social, and other shifting lines will racial
politics be subordinated. When there are large numbers of black
doctors, shopkeepers, corporate executives, developers, engineers,
shareholders, and so on, the problem will be solved. This must be
the goal of the United States, if the clash of private interests is to
continue to serve as our means of approaching the common good.
II
America's tragedy has been her failure to guarantee the equal-
ity among the races so manifestly required by the structure and
theory of her government. The country has paid a price. It took a
bloody civil war to extirpate slavery, and an acrimonious Recon-
struction to attempt, unsuccessfully, to eradicate the gross inequal-
ity that remained. More recently there has been disorder in our
cities and elsewhere, which has subsided into squabbling among
races and ethnic groups for larger shares of an economic pie now
perceived by many to be shrinking. Obviously, the problem of ine-
quality has not been solved, and we can expect further racial trou-
bles in the future until its solution. A nation preconditioned on
I See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 778.
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equality among its major groups cannot function with such a con-
tradiction in its midst.
Unfortunately, inequality among the races is extraordinarily
difficult to eradicate. Many persons expected that, once formal dis-
crimination had been curbed, members of deprived minorities
would have little difficulty in entering into the mainstream of
American economic and social life. It has not been so-even assum-
ing optimistically that most formal discrimination has now ceased.
We should have known that inequality would continue until we
took active steps to end it. As de Tocqueville predicted long before
slavery was abolished, "[a] natural prejudice leads a man to scorn
anybody who has been his inferior, long after he has become his
equal; the real inequality . . . is always followed by an imagined
inequality rooted in mores." 8 This "imagined inequality rooted in
mores" plagues our civic life with a vengeance, and will continue to
do so until experience proves that blacks can serve competently in
all levels of society.
Inequality and disadvantage do not end simply because we
pass laws against them. For a member of a deprived minority
group to succeed, he must develop the discipline, drive, and skills
demanded by the marketplace. Unfortunately, schools and job
training programs cannot effectively impart such attributes, or our
task would be relatively easy. Rather, the most basic education
needed by a person entering the economic and social mainstream of
this country must usually be provided in the home. And although
many disadvantaged parents try very hard to train their children
for productive lives, they succeed too rarely. A black mother and
father, deprived by past discrimination of an adequate education,
and inured because of past experience to second-class status, may
often be unable to help their children to develop their academic
skills and self-confidence. Their despair, compounded by the cruel-
ties of the welfare system as it is administered, may indeed cause a
breakdown in the family structure altogether-to the severe detri-
ment of their children's chances to take advantage of opportunities
now open by law to them. Discrimination, having once taken its
toll, can in this manner perpetuate its effects long after the society
has adopted formal equality in its racial practices
" A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 341 (J. Mayer ed. G. Lawrence trans.
1969).
National economic statistics prove beyond doubt that inequality continues unabated,
and even indicate that it may be increasing. The ratio of the unemployment rate of black
19791
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Moreover, poverty and race, acting in conjunction, tend to pro-
duce prejudice. So long as most blacks are poor, they will continue
to exhibit the work habits and other characteristics of the poor that
often impede success in the employment and society of middle-
class America. And so long as white persons associate being black
with being poor, they will tend to discriminate against blacks, no
matter how open-minded they may imagine themselves to be. This
places the poor black in a situation far more desperate than that of
his poor white counterpart. Both must overcome severe educational
handicaps, but the black must in addition overcome the obstacles
of racial prejudice.10
It has become increasingly evident that this cycle of discrimi-
nation, deprivation, inadequate education, and renewed discrimi-
nation must be broken if a genuine equality is to emerge. Doing
nothing-or doing nothing but prohibiting the more obvious forms
of racial discrimination-will avail little against the momentum of
poverty and discrimination that we have allowed to build. To
break this cycle requires, as a matter of common sense, special
treatment for the victims of past discrimination. Such special
treatment may appear unnatural-even unfair in the short
run-but the only alternative is to allow the effects of our history of
discrimination to plague our civic life in perpetuity.
Oddly, affirmative efforts designed to remedy the effects of
past racial or ethnic discrimination have aroused far more heated
opposition, both in the public and in the Supreme Court, than
have efforts to remedy other forms of discrimination. Even though
it is now well established, as a matter of either constitutional or
statutory law, that discrimination against older persons, handi-
capped persons, and women is illegal, we find that private and gov-
ernmental efforts on their behalf are largely considered unobjec-
tionable. Who doubts that Social Security for the aged and special
programs for the handicapped are legal and constitutional? Affirm-
ative action on behalf of women is more controversial, at least in
males to that of white males was 2.2 in 1977 and 2.7 in 1979. The ratio of the unemployment
rate of Hispanic males to that of white males was 1.7 in 1977 and 1.6 in 1979. U.S. CoM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1979, at 21 n.2 (1980). In business, progress has
been almost as scant. In 1972, minority-owned businesses generated 0.71; of all American
business receipts. In 1977 this figure had increased to only 2.1%. Id. at 26 (citing U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, A NEW STRATEGY FOR MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT (1979)).
10 The persistence of racial prejudice is well documented. See, e.g., id. at 1-2 (housing
discrimination).
[47:213
Color-Blind Theories
some settings," but the Supreme Court-with the acquiescence of
some opponents of racial affirmative action' 2-has sustained special
benefits to women on the ground that such benefits are needed to
remedy the relative economic deprivation of women caused by eco-
nomic discrimination.' 3 Readers of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Weber" must surely be surprised to read his dissent in Califano v.
Goldfarb,'5 in which he urged the Court to uphold a provision of
the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program
that favored widows over widowers.'" Justice Rehnquist called this
difference in treatment "scarcely an invidious discrimination,""
and explained: "The differentiation in no way perpetuates the eco-
nomic discrimination which has been the basis for heightened scru-
tiny of gender-based classifications, and is, in fact, explainable as a
measure to ameliorate the characteristically depressed condition of
aged widows."' 8 Of course, this logic is equally applicable to race-
based affirmative action, which in no way perpetuates the eco-
nomic or other discrimination that was the basis for strict scrutiny,
and which in fact serves to ameliorate the depressed condition of
blacks and other deprived minority group members. Since the "de-
pressed condition" of minority persons in the United States is more
intractable, and arguably more severe and politically divisive, than
that of women, what supports the proposition that it is legitimate
to help the latter, but not the former, to overcome past
discrimination?
" One major concern is that programs ostensibly for the benefit of women may actually
be predicated on outmoded stereotypes about the role of women in society, and thus may
serve to impede the efforts of women to obtain genuine equality. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
" Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Douglas, J.) and Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Stewart, J.) with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J., joined by, inter alia, Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) and DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) (per curiam)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from finding of mootness).
11 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
" United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Strictly speaking, Justice Rehnquist's dissents in Goldfarb and Weber are not contra-
dictory, since the former concerned a constitutional and the latter a statutory issue. Never-
theless, the Justice's recognition of the noninvidious nature of the discrimination in Goldfarb
stands in sharp contrast to his description of affirmative action in Weber as "a creator of
castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order to prefer another." 443 U.S. at
254.
17 430 U.S. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19 Id.
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Rarely do opponents of affirmative action on behalf of racial or
ethnic minorities squarely confront the undeniable need of those
minorities for special assistance, or the grave consequences of con-
tinuing to deny such assistance. Rather, they immediately retreat
to the abstract ground of high principle. They assert the necessity
of strict neutrality between the races, and urge the courts to adopt
what they invariably describe as a "color-blind" theory of the Con-
stitution and laws. They argue that such neutrality is required by
the equal protection clause, thereby giving a new twist to Justice
Holmes's disparaging characterization of equal protection claims as
"the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."'" In fact, strict
"color-blindness" of a sort was frequently urged by opponents of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This strict neutrality would require
that the government not interfere with the decisions made by its
citizens, whatever their basis. Just as the government has no busi-
ness telling its citizens that they should treat ballet the same way
that they treat roller derby, so also should it permit its citizens to
prefer whites to blacks, blacks to whites, or whatever. In this way,
the government could remain aloof from the matter of color; it
would treat all citizens exactly alike. 0
Whether or not we fully realize it, this nation has irrevocably
rejected the strict "color-blind" theory of government. Now it is
agreed and solemnly enacted into law that racism-both govern-
mental and private-is wrong, and that the government should em-
ploy its power to eradicate it. The purpose of this legislation cannot
be denied: to help blacks and members of other minority groups
overcome the prejudice that oppresses them. Its effect is to give
special advantage to those minority groups. To call such legislation
, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
20 Even this limited position of strict neutrality of the government toward matters of
racial preference would be preferable to the mandatory apartheid approved in Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The challenged state statute in Plessy required railway compa-
nies to segregate their passengers by race, depriving members of the public of the right to
choose an integrated setting for their travels. That this type of legislation impeded good-
spirited voluntary efforts to promote racial harmony and equality is clear from Berea College
v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). Berea College was and is a private religious college in the
Appalachian region of Kentucky dedicated to the education of white and black students
without segregation or discrimination. This commendable practice was outlawed by passage
of a criminal statute in Kentucky, which was sustained by the Supreme Court, id. at 58,
over an eloquent dissent by Justice Harlan, id. Presumably, under the strict color-blind
theory of the Constitution, such odious legislation would be struck down.
[47:213
Color-Blind Theories
"color-blind" is a meaningless abstraction. Legislation against in-
vidious discrimination helps one race and not the other because
one race and not the other needs such help. Blacks and members of
other minority groups receive special protection against the irra-
tional or malevolent decisions of states, schools, or employers, be-
cause they need it. Equal protection for them is not the same pro-
tection accorded others.
Two Supreme Court cases nicely illustrate this point. In Reit-
man v. Mulkey,2' the voters of California approved by referendum
a new provision in the state constitution guaranteeing to residential
property owners the right to refuse to sell their property to any per-
son, on any ground, including race. In Hunter v. Erickson, 2 the
voters of Akron, Ohio approved a city charter amendment that pre-
vented the passage of any open housing ordinances without ap-
proval by referendum. The Supreme Court did not deny that the
challenged provisions were neutral on their face, and did not deny
that cities and states have the right to decline to enact fair housing
laws. The Court nevertheless struck down both provisions because
they made it more difficult for minority groups that suffer discrimi-
nation to obtain political redress. In short, minority groups have
been given special consideration for their interests, and special pro-
tections against the majoritarian political process, because of the
reality that otherwise they will continue to be oppressed by an un-
sympathetic and often hostile majority. They require greater assis-
tance to receive equal protection. As Justice Blackmun has said,
"[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race
... . And in order to treat persons equally, we must treat them
differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the equal protection
clause perpetrate racial supremacy. '"
This paradox has not discouraged some persons from insisting
that it is possible to protect minority groups against discrimina-
tion-and indeed to remedy past instances of discrimina-
tion-without racial preference. It should be evident by now that
no such course is available; the "color-blind" theorists are either
deluding themselves, or are insincere in their commitment to
equality. Instead of debating the abstract merit of the proposition
that the government may not "regulate or allocate by race, ' ' 24 we
21 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
23 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.).
11 Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 777.
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must ask two simple, practical questions. First, how can we detect
the effects of racial or ethnic discrimination? Second, how can we
remedy them? If we neither detect nor remedy invidious discrimi-
nation, then obviously we have no antidiscrimination policy. But if
we do, we will discover that we have begun to "regulate or allocate
by race."
A
Professor Philip Kurland has recently written to decry the
"new egalitarianism, "'2' which he describes as a perversion of the
equal protection clause so as "not to require equality under law for
select minorities, but to afford them preferences. 126 To Professor
Kurland, the "new egalitarianism" is no venial constitutional
aberration:
My principal personal complaint about the new
egalitarianism is that its goal seems to be homogenization of the
human race, nay, that it already assumes homogeneity as the
fact. My creed is different. With Judge Learned Hand, I have a
"faith in the indefectible significance of each one of us." I think
that the question posed by the egalitarianism of today is
"whether the ultimate value shall be this wistful cloudly, errant
You or I, or that Great Beast, Leviathan." And for me the choice
is easy.2
It is not too late to turn back from the new egalitarianism to
the old equality. It is not too late to turn back from Leviathan.
But it soon may be. 8
While Professor Kurland's attention is riveted on the apocalypse,
he loses interest in the practical problem of solving racial discrimi-
nation. Federal judges cannot be so lofty; they must detect and
remedy specific instances of discrimination. Professor Kurland of-
fers this comment:
It is one thing to say that if A has been excluded from a job or
a place in school because he is black, . . . [he] should be and
is now entitled by law to the place that should have been his
were it not for his race . . . , and to monetary compensation
25 Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 18.
6' Id.
11 Id. at 20 (quoting L. HAND, THE SPmrr OF LmmsTY 173, 82 (Phoenix ed. 1977)) (foot-
notes omitted).
2 Id. at 23.
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for the period of deprivation . . . . It is another thing, how-
ever, to say that one becomes entitled to a place not because
he has been discriminated against, but simply because he is
black .... 21
But is it so clearly "another thing"?
If all racial discrimination were blatant, it might be possible to
apply Professor Kurland's simple rule of justice. But we have come
to recognize that discriminators do not always announce them-
selves clearly: more often they employ ostensibly neutral criteria to
accomplish their desired end. Unfortunately, direct proof of dis-
criminatory motivation is usually difficult, often impossible, to ob-
tain. 0 Thus, experience has proven what common sense would oth-
erwise suggest: to establish evidence of illegal racial discrimination,
the courts must employ reasonable presumptions about causes and
results. If a member of a minority group is qualified for a job open-
ing, but is denied the job, then-in the absence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation-racial discrimination may be pre-
sumed.' This is hardly a radical way of evaluating a charge of dis-
crimination: given the pervasive, subtle, and persistent history of
racial discrimination in this nation's workplaces, it is not unreason-
able to presume that a black applicant rejected for no apparent
legitimate reason is a victim of discrimination. But by this mode of
analysis, have we not given the black applicant preferential treat-
ment-"simply because he is black"? In effect, the qualified black
applicant is given an entitlement to employment, denied to simi-
larly qualified white applicants. The qualified white applicant, de-
nied a job on the basis of some irrational or bigoted decision of the
employer, is relegated to his luck. Given the subjective nature of
the employment decision, the law must prefer the black applicant
2 Id. at 18.
See B. SCHLEI & P. ,GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 16 (1976).
' See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The prima facie case to
be borne by the Title VII plaintiff alleging unlawful failure to hire consists of four parts:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. This showing shifts the burden of proof to the employer to "articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." -d. The plaintiff then has a
final opportunity to prove that the asserted reason for rejection was a "pretext" for discrimi-
nation. Id. at 804. Statistics showing underemployment of the plaintiff's racial group are
relevant to that inquiry. Id. at 805.
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because he is black in order to ensure that employers do not dis-
criminate against him because he is black.
Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory
intent, it seems reasonable to presume that an actor intends the
natural consequence of his deeds. As Justice Stevens has pointed
out, this implies that "[firequently the most probative evidence of
intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the ac-
tor." ' In the employment area, we should evaluate personnel poli-
cies and practices not solely on the basis of their purposes, but also
on the basis of their consequences." If an employer's practices con-
sistently cause the disproportionate hiring of members of the ma-
jority race, and if the employer can show no legitimate business
purpose for those practices, then-again given the pervasive, sub-
tle, and persistent history of racial discrimination-we can pre-
sume that the challenged practices are discriminatory. Nine years
after the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,34 few persons would
dispute this. But the same proposition, restated, is: absent legiti-
mate business reasons, employers must adopt employment prac-
tices that result in the hiring of minority workers roughly in pro-
portion to their availability in the pool of qualified laborers.
To some, this looks like "reverse discrimination." Before they
condemn it, however, they should provide some credible explana-
tion of why allegedly, neutral employment practices3 5 should pro-
duce rankly unneutral results. Can anyone believe that low hiring
32 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
31 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("Congress directed the thrust
of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.") (em-
phasis in original).
11 Id. The Court held: "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
" Not all employment practices that cause the disproportionate hiring of white employ-
ees are illegitimate, of course. Only practices that erect "artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barriers to employment" are proscribed by Title VII. Id. at 431. "Congress did not
intend by Title VII . . .to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications." Id.
at 430. I believe that much of the opposition to affirmative action among employers is the
product of a misunderstanding on this point. To allay such misunderstanding-and also to
enforce Title VII faithfully-the courts and the EEOC should be careful to respect the legiti-
mate business needs of employers, even where those needs cannot be precisely documented
or quantified. But they must be vigilant as well to ensure that discriminatory practices do
not intrude into the nation's workplaces in the guise of legitimate business practices. See
generally Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under
Title VII, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 911 (1979); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
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rates for blacks are the product of chance?" Unless there is a legiti-
mate explanation for the disparities, a fair-minded person should
not be reluctant to conclude that something is amiss. In short, a
serious commitment to removing race barriers from the nation's
workplaces requires steps to remove racial disparities in hiring. If
this be "reverse discrimination," make the most of it: I know of no
other way to enforce the antidiscrimination laws.
B
Racial discrimination must not only be detected, but it must
also be remedied. In practice, this requires that the courts and
other institutions engaged in remedying past discrimination begin
to prefer minority groups to the majority. Even if they adopt a
"color-blind" theory, they will find that preferential methods are
the only effective means of executing it.
This much seems to be admitted by most critics of affirmative
action. Professor William Van Alstyne, for example, recently ar-
gued that "regulation and allocation by race are wrong," no matter
what the purpose of the regulation or allocation may be .3 Never-
theless, he was willing to agree with Supreme Court decisions that
"paired racially identifiable schools, redrafted attendance lines, or
mandated busing ' 38 strictly on the basis of race. His justification is
suggestive: "In each instance, the fulcrum of judicial leverage was
an existing governmental race line, which the particular judicial
order sought to remove. The object was thus to disestablish partic-
ular, existing uses of race, not to establish new ones.":" Apparently,
therefore, Professor Van Alstyne makes an exception to his other-
wise categorical condemnation of "regulation and allocation by
race" and would permit such regulation and allocation if it is use-
ful to "disestablish particular, existing uses of race."
Professor Van Alstyne's principle is subject to a wider con-
struction than he may expect. He seems to be thinking of a situa-
3 Cf. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-31 (1972) (inference of discrimination
from disproportionate selection of white grand jurors).
0 '7 Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 792. In fact, Professor Van Alstyne stated that the
message of the Supreme Court civil rights decisions is "commendably even stronger." Id. He
said that "[laws that divide and index people to measure their civil rights by race are un-
constitutional. Laws that encourage others to do so are similarly invalid. And laws attempt-
ing to advance either policy even in disguise will likewise be struck down whenever it is
within the capacity of conscientious courts to see beneath their cellophane wrappers."
11 Id. at 784.
31' Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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tion in which race lines were established by the very instrumental-
ity of government now attempting to disestablish them. An
example might be a school board that once operated a dual system,
and that now is required to integrate pupils and teachers so as to
eradicate the vestiges of the dual system. But may an instrumen-
tality of government seek to remedy the effects of a race line drawn
not by it but by a separate agency? For example, may a housing
agency employ color-conscious criteria in selecting new housing
sites in order to compensate for the residential segregation caused
in the past by zoning regulations or other practices of governmental
agencies? The answer must surely be "yes," since the various gov-
ernmental agencies are merely instrumentalities of a single respon-
sible actor.4 0 And why should not a governmental agency be per-
mitted to take steps to disestablish the race lines wrongfully
erected by its citizens?4 In a sense, all civil rights law is an at-
tempt by government to correct the injustices created by privately
imposed slavery. Government is little more than the organized arm
of society. If concerted action by the citizenry is needed to correct
past abuses committed by the citizens as individuals, there is no
apparent reason why it cannot democratically choose to take that
action through its organized arm. If race lines are wrong, then
they are wrong no matter who was responsible for their establish-
ment. It makes little sense to hamstring those in a position to
fashion remedies in the way Professor Van Alstyne seems to
suggest.
The principle of disestablishing race lines may also be ex-
tended to the private sector. There is no reason to confine its opera-
tion to "governmental" race lines. If a corporation or other private
0 The Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), may have held that one state
governmental entity cannot be required to remedy the effects of another's discriminatory
decisions. It reversed a lower court order requiring 53 school districts in suburban Detroit to
participate in cross-district busing, stating that cross-district remedies for the segregation of
a single district could not be required unless interdistrict segregative effects had been
proved. But cf. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (upholding a plan requiring the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development to build public housing in Chicago suburbs
even though the plan would involve separate local governments apparently innocent of pat
discrimination). Even so, nothing in Milliken detracts from the power of separate govern-
mental entities to participate voluntarily in cross-jurisdictional affirmative action if they so
choose.
1 Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("School
authorities. . .might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in
a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole.").
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association is motivated to eradicate race lines in its organization,
it should be encouraged to do so-and permitted to do so without
making admissions about past illegal action that would precipitate
costly lawsuits against it.42 Surely Professor Van Alstyne, who
nearly twenty years ago pointed out the fallacies in the application
of the "state action" requirement,' :1 would not now decree a "state
action" limitation on affirmative remedies.
Thus, the principle of disestablishing race lines, stripped of its
artificial restrictions, would justify a large range of affirmative ac-
tion programs: race-conscious public housing construction, in order
to erase the race line of segregated housing; race-conscious special
admissions programs in professional schools, to erase the race line
of segregated professions and student bodies; race-conscious hiring
or training programs, to erase the race lines in employment. In-
deed, it is difficult to think of a reasonable affirmative action pro-
gram that could not be justified on the basis of the need to "dises-
tablish particular, existing uses of race."
Other practical concerns make some form of racial regulation
useful. Without it, the courts would be unable to monitor compli-
ance with their decrees effectively." Congress would be unable to
determine whether federal contracts are being granted to firms in
compliance with its desire to eradicate racial disparities in con-
tracting, minority group members would be reluctant to waste their
time applying for jobs withheld from them in the past without
some clear indication of change, employers or admissions officers
would be unable to correct the pernicious effects of culturally bi-
ased testing, 5 businesses would be left uncertain about their obli-
,1 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
43 Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961).
" Professor Alan Freeman has propounded a telling example of this:
Suppose a municipality has gerrymandered its districts so that the entire black popula-
tion is in one district, and every other district is white, and you have evidence of pur-
poseful discrimination. If you go to court and get the practice declared illegal, what's
the remedy? Suppose the court simply issues an order to the municipality that says
"stop doing that." And then a redistricting follows, with most of the black population
still in the one district, and a handful of people shifted elsewhere. Assume there is no
further evidence of "purposeful" discrimination. How do you know if the new scheme is
a violation or not?
A. Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization (Oct. 25,
1978) (to be published in a collection of essays edited by Professor Derrick Bell tentatively
entitled ALTERNATIVE VISIONS: REVISIONIST ESSAYS ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (Teachers' Col-
lege Press 1980)).
", See Sexton, Minority-Admissions Programs after Bakke, 49 HARV. EDUC. RFv. 313.
324-27, 333-34 (1979).
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gations under the law, society would be unable to address those
subtle forms of discrimination not yet detected or proved, and civil
rights, religious, and other public-spirited groups would be unable
to discover the proper objects for application of moral pressure.
Without objective evidence of result based on a rough element of
racial proportionality, discriminators would be able to mask the
motives for their decisions behind their unchallengeable discretion.
In short, only clear, easily monitored goals and timetables are
likely to make a real difference.
IV
Few parties in litigation now question the broad discretion of
courts to remedy proven past discrimination, even using preferen-
tial goals and quotas, however controversial the practice may still
be in academia or among the public. Although the Supreme Court
has never authoritatively approved racial hiring or promotion quo-
tas imposed by court decree, the lower federal courts have uni-
formly done so." But controversy still rages over the seemingly sub-
sidiary issue of who may determine when race-conscious remedies
are needed. Some argue that such remedies are appropriate only
when particular acts of past discrimination have been proven in
some authoritative public forum: by court decree if possible, or
maybe by administrative or congressional determination.
On the surface, this purported limitation on the freedom of in-
stitutions to remedy the effects of past misdeeds seems curious. It
seems to suggest that affirmative action is forbidden unless it is
required: an unusual proposition under our jurisprudence. More-
over, in an age when moderates and conservatives are usually
heard to praise the virtues of voluntarism and to decry coercion, it
is surprising that on this issue they should forbid uncoerced acts
to remedy injustice. In an age when moderates and conservatives
are quick to point out the inefficiencies and perversities of deci-
sion making by bureaucrats, politicans, and judges, it is peculiar
to hear them say that only such officials have the ability accu-
rately to discern racial discrimination. In an age when moderates
and conservatives frequently express concern that businesses are
unfairly throttled by unclear and inconsistent governmental pro-
nouncements, it is odd that they should be willing to impose an-
, See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 30, at 1199-1200. The decision in Weber
presumably lays this question to rest, at least by implication.
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tidiscrimination laws on employers and unions, but deny them the
only clear and manageable way of ensuring compliance with the
law.
The decision in Weber settled the most important aspect of
this dispute: "that Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703(a) and (d)
against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, volun-
tary, race-conscious affirmative action plans."47 At least in the case
of private employers, therefore, reasonable affirmative action plans
are permissible despite the absence of any judicial, administrative,
or congressional finding of discrimination.
Were it not for Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke,"5 I would have thought the matter
settled in other statutory " or constitutional areas as well. In Bakke,
however, Justice Powell said that a racially based classification
cannot be upheld on the ground that it "aids persons perceived as
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other in-
nocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or ad-
ministrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. '"!"
Does Justice Powell really mean to limit constructive efforts to
remedy the effects of past discrimination to those aimed at specific
discriminatory acts identified by a governmental tribunal? In the
face of the past treatment of this nation's black citizens by the
white majority, it takes no special expertise to see that the present
disadvantaged position of blacks can be traced directly to that un-
fair treatment. Why is a governmental tribunal needed to tell us
what we already know? The only effect such a requirement could
have would be to slow the process by preventing persons of goodwill
from helping to remedy this pressing inequality. If we must wait for
governmental tribunals, we may wait forever.
The appeal to the expertise of a governmental tribunal seems
especially strained in the context of Bakke. Justice Powell stated
that the University of California at Davis was "not competent ' 5 ' to
11 443 U.S. at 208.
4K 438 U.S. 265 (1978). There was no opinion of the Court in Bakke. but most scholars
and lawyers treat Justice Powell's opinion, id. at 269, as if it were controlling, even though
his constitutional holding in favor of Bakke was joined by no other Justice.
" In Weber, Justice Brennan indicated that Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000e (1976), "cannot be read in pari materia." 443 U.S. at 206
n.6. Thus Title VI, at issue in Bakke, may not allow for voluntary affirmative action efforts
at least to the same extent as does Title VII.
" 438 U.S. at 307.
Id. at 309.
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make findings concerning past discrimination. The "broad mis-
sion" of the University, the Justice said, "is education, and not the
formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particu-
lar claims of illegality." 2 Were it not for this pronouncement, most
persons probably would think that education professionals are the
most "competent" to judge the effects of various causes on the edu-
cational attainments of students-certainly in a better position
than judges or bureaucrats. One would also think that education
professionals are the most "competent" to decide what sort of re-
medial program would be most effective in counteracting past dis-
crimination. Moreover, as an agency receiving federal funds, the
University was explicitly authorized by HEW regulations to "take
affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which re-
sulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race,
color, or national origin."53 Apparently HEW did not think any
special "competence" necessary to perceive that blacks and mem-
bers of other minorities have suffered discrimination in the past;
the Regents of the University of California obviously were not dis-
abled on that score. 54 So long as the remedial purpose of the pro-
gram was clear, what difference did it make that the need for it
was perceived by the University and not by the courts? Allan
Bakke is equally disadvantaged either way, and there is no reason
to suppose that one way of making the necessary determinations is
more or less accurate than the other. The primary effect of impos-
ing the hurdle of "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings"
is to make affirmative action programs rarer by making them pro-
cedurally more complicated to obtain.
In short, vigilance in the detection and remedy of racial dis-
crimination requires race-consciousness, and such race-conscious-
ness can be legitimate in a variety of circumstances, on the part of
a variety of institutions. In the last few years the Supreme Court,
albeit haltingly, has approved the use of race-conscious remedies
by both public and private institutions on the basis of a number of
52 Id.
53 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii) (1979). Justice Powell disregarded this explicit delegation of
authority to the University of California by the federal department most closely associated
with enforcement of equal educational opportunity.
31 The only disagreement Justice Powell expressed with the University's substantive
conclusions about the need for remedial assistance was that Asians were included in the
program, in spite of the large numbers of Asians admitted through the regular admissions
process. 438 U.S. at 309 n.45.
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rationales. 5 In my view, this means that a significant victory
against discrimination has been won, a victory that "color-blind"
theory could never have achieved.
V
Difficult questions remain. Just as it is clear that courts should
not overturn affirmative action programs simply because they are
"discriminatory," so also is it clear that the courts must be vigilant
to ensure that new forms of invidious discrimination are not ap-
proved in the guise of remedial affirmative action. In this the crit-
ics of affirmative action are correct: by rejecting a clear line against
remedial racial preferences, the courts have taken on an oversight
task of great subtlety and difficulty. So far, the courts have been
faced with cases challenging the principle of affirmative action, not
with cases difficult to decide on their facts. Weber l was essentially
an easy case on its facts because the affirmative hiring program
was plainly temporary, and because no workers were deprived of a
right to advancement that they previously had considered theirs.
Bakke"7 was easy because the program employed .fixed, undisguised
numerical quotas. United Jewish Organizations"5 might have been
hard had the Court focused on the discrimination against Hasidic
Jews-clearly a discrete and insular minority-rather than treating
the disadvantaged voters as "white." Under the Court's approach,
however, the case was easy because "whites" are well represented
in the New York legislature, and because the redistricting was
overseen by the Attorney General under the explicit mandate of
the Voting Rights Act. The principles of these cases were of course
difficult and controversial; but once the principle had been decided
upon, the cases themselves presented few problems.
Not so cases in the future. As Professor Van Alstyne has
pointed out, the courts must inevitably face "numerous" and
"rank"5 decisions about: "which races; how much to each race; by
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977);
Franks v. Bowman Constr. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Lau v. Nichols. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See
also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
1' United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
57 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11 United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
5' Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 808.
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what test is each of us to be assigned 'our' race?"' He is, I think,
overly pessimistic when he suggests that the courts will be without
constitutional bases for the decisions and will be "overwhelmed"
by the task, or will instead abdicate oversight to executive or ad-
ministrative bodies." Such pessimism may be the result of an
overly punctilious standard for evaluating affirmative action pro-
grams: many apparent problems are less serious when affirmative
action is evaluated in a more flexible and generous spirit. Never-
theless, Professor Van Alstyne is quite correct that there are diffi-
cult problems of adjudication ahead, and there is little in our juris-
prudence to date that will guide us in the project. 2
The common-law method of case-by-case adjudication may
well serve us better in this area than any overarching theories or
principles. As the courts sift through affirmative action programs,
upholding some, striking down others, the proper grounds for dis-
tinction will in time appear. This apparently is the approach de-
cided upon by the Supreme Court. In Bakke, the Court struck
down one plan and, in dictum, praised another. In actuality, the
lower courts are left with broad discretion to judge such plans in
the future.13 The much-lamented confusion of the Bakke opinion
may thus be its jurisprudential strength: by deciding little, and
providing less than clear reasons, Bakke keeps the future open for
us. Weber was more explicit on this score: "We need not today de-
fine in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and im-
permissible affirmative action plans."" This gives little guidance to
the lower courts in the short run; in the long run, however, it
,o Id. at 804 (emphasis in original). But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 359 n.35 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted):
But, were we asked to decide whether any given rival group ...must constitu-
tionally be accorded preferential treatment, we do have a "principled basis" . . . for
deciding this question, one that is well established in our cases. . . . [T~he only question
is whether it was rational for Davis to conclude that the groups it preferred had a greater
claim to compensation than the groups it excluded. . . .Thus, claims of rival groups,
although they may create thorny political problems, create relatively simple problems for
the courts.
" Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 808. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (Powell, J.).
11 I doubt that the question "by what test is each of us to be assigned 'our' race?" will
realistically be in dispute in most cases. I am content to leave most racial identification to
the persons involved, except in cases of outright fraud.
63 See generally Edwards, Preferential Remedies and Affirmative Action in Employment
in the Wake of Bakke, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 113; Sexton, supra note 45.
11 443 U.S. at 208.
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makes less likely the adoption of rigid and inapt distinctions that
might prove difficult to correct.
It is therefore with some trepidation that I put forth several
considerations that I believe may help to distinguish permissible
from impermissible affirmative action plans. No one consideration
should be dispositive; rather the court should decide, based on all
relevant considerations, whether the challenged discrimination is
invidious. Some of these proposed considerations may prove un-
workable or wrongheaded; surely the list will be proven incomplete.
Nevertheless, now that the principle of affirmative action has been
essentially upheld, I think it is time to begin to think about the
next step.15 The following are in no particular order:
What is the relation between the decisionmaker and the bur-
dened and preferred groups? One of the hallmarks of invidious dis-
crimination has been that the decisionmaker-whether govern-
ment, school, business, union, or whatever-acts out of ignorance
or dislike of a racial or ethnic group he does not belong to. Because
he is unfamiliar with members of a different and isolated group, he
may predicate his decisions on stereotypes and bigoted misconcep-
tions. The fundamental purpose of the equal protection clause is to
ensure that governmental decisionmakers treat other groups the
same way they treat their own, so as to prevent them from harm-
ing-either wittingly or unwittingly-an unrepresented minority.
Thus, discrimination by the white majority against discrete, insu-
lar, and powerless minorities is considered "invidious" and sub-
jected to "strict scrutiny" because we are suspicious that the ends
sought by the majority may be illegitimate or the means irra-
tional.'" Even where there may be a legitimate basis for treating
groups differently, a discriminatory law must be struck down under
1 This is not, of course, the first attempt to marshal the considerations necessary for
deciding affirmative action cases in the future. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 171-78 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); EEOC, Affirmative
Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1979).
" See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (dictum)
("prejudic-e against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry"). Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) ("the
class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful une-
qual treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process").
1979]
The University of Chicago Law Review
the equal protection clause if it is based on outmoded perceptions
that certain groups are weak or inferior.
But when a decisionmaker chooses to disadvantage members
of his own racial or ethnic group, it may hardly be supposed that
he is acting out of prejudice, ignorance, or hostility. 7 Such deci-
sions should not be considered "suspect" in the usual sense. As
Professor John Hart Ely put it:
When the group that controls the decision making process
classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage it-
self, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, conse-
quently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking. A
White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of
racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to under-
estimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those of
others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative
classification that would extend to certain Whites the advan-
tages generally extended to Blacks.6 8
Many affirmative action programs will be of this sort, and should,
in general, be upheld by the courts. Weber 9 is a good example. The
decision to prefer blacks to whites for the training program at Kai-
ser Aluminum was negotiated by the company and the union.
Since the union membership is made up primarily of persons like
Brian Weber, the decision was not likely to be "invidious"-that is,
not likely to be predicated on prejudice or hostility toward the dis-
advantaged group. ° When the majority group acts to disadvantage
11 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), may be an exception to this general rule.
In Castaneda, the Court found that the grand jury selection system of Hidalgo County,
Texas, was invidiously discriminatory against Mexican Americans, even though the judge,
the majority of the jury commissioners, and the majority of the elected officials of the county
were Mexican Americans. Justice Marshall, concurring, stated that:
Social scientists agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to discrimi-
nation and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to
the point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority. Such be-
havior occurs with particular frequency among members of minority groups who have
achieved some measure of economic or political success and thereby have gained some
acceptability among the dominant group.
Id. at 503 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). One might add that members of the
majority group sometimes adopt the minority's negative attitude toward the majority, but
surely such reactions are comparatively rare in both situations.
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723,
735 (1974).
"' United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
71 In two respects, however, Weber might be considered slightly more troublesome.
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itself for the benefit of the minority, there should be a strong pre-
sumption of legality.7'
As Professor Ely points out, however, not all affirmative action
plans are genuinely benign in this sense..7 1 Sometimes, the non-
"suspect" facade of white-black decisions will obscure a subtler,
and less innocuous, form of discrimination. In particular, a group
of whites in power may establish a remedial program for the bene-
fit of blacks, to the detriment of a discrete and powerless subgroup
of whites. Indeed, it may be "the natural consequence of our gov-
erning processes that the most 'discrete and insular' of whites often
will be called to bear the immediate, direct costs of benign discrim-
ination. 7 3 One troubling instance of this may have been the
United Jewish Organizations4 decision. In that case, legislative dis-
trict lines in New York City were redrawn under the pressure of the
Voting Rights Act so as to increase the representation of nonwhite
voters. To do so, a compact district of predominantly Hasidic Jew-
ish voters, which had traditionally sent a representative to Albany,
was split in two. The Hasidim lost their legislative seat. The Su-
preme Court upheld the districting plan, because it treated the
Hasidim as merely "white" voters. As the concurring opinion indi-
cates, however, the increase in nonwhite representation could have
been accomplished in other ways. The state officials chose to split
the Hasidic community in half rather than to redistribute a "more
varied and diffuse range" of white voters into predominantly non-
First, the union officials who negotiated the contract with Kaiser Aluminum might not be
representative of their members: they might constitute a type of white ruling class willing to
sacrifice the interests of the workers. Second, the union might have a conflict of interest with
its members. Because the union might face lawsuits alleging racial discrimination, it might
have chosen to adopt the affirmative action program to protect the union's coffers, with little
concern for the consequences on its membership. In general, however, we can safely presume
that an elected leadership will adequately defend the interests of its constituency-or at
least that it will harbor no prejudice against, or hostility toward, them.
11 Special deference may be due a congressional determination that certain forms of
affirmative action are necessary to effectuate the substantive provisions of the fourteenth
amendment: "§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
72 Ely, supra note 68, at 736-39.
13 United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 174 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part). It is possible that many upper-class whites, professionals, and academics de-
rive personal satisfaction and approbation from others by appearing to be "liberal" and
"progressive." To sacrifice the interests of less advantaged whites for this reason may be less
"benign" than affirmative action may generally be presumed to be.
74 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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white districts.75 I am not saying that, given the state of the record,
the plan necessarily should have been struck down; perhaps, how-
ever, the Court should have remanded the case for a consideration
of the issue.76
One consequence of this approach to affirmative action pro-
grams is that the courts must scrutinize somewhat more carefully
those programs instituted by decisionmakers of the minority race.
When black decisionmakers, for example, choose to disadvantage
white persons, there is no a priori reason to assume that they are
not acting out of prejudice or hostility. This does not mean, how-
ever, that all minority-instituted affirmative action programs must
be struck down: such programs should merely be denied the pre-
sumptive validity granted programs instituted by the groups disad-
vantaged by them. We may no more assume that minority prefer-
ence programs are "invidious" when members of a minority are in
control than we may assume that policies disadvantaging members
of minorities are necessarily benign on account of such control.77
Still, the courts may in some circumstances need to protect power-
less white persons from invidious discrimination at the hands of
black majorities.
Will the classification tend to stigmatize members of a group?
Ever since the Court in Brown v. Board of Education78 declared
school segregation unconstitutional on the ground that it "gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to [black children's] status in the
11 Id. at 174-75 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Some evidence suggests that if an
alternative districting plan had been adopted, leaving the Hasidic district intact, the desired
nonwhite majority in the adjoining district would have fallen from 65' ' to 63.4'1 . State offi-
cials apparently perceived that the Attorney General required no less than a 65'c nonwhite
majority. Id. at 181-82 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
11 The district court ruled that the petitioners had no constitutionally protected rights
as Hasidic Jews, id. at 153, and petitioners apparently did not pursue this claim, id. at 178
(Brennan, J., concurring in part). This partially explains why the majority blandly discussed
the issues of the case as if the Hasidim were indistinguishable from the other whites of New
York.
A second problem in the case that received no attention from the majority was the claim
by Puerto Rican voters that they were disadvantaged by the redistricting plan. Id. at 173
(Brennan, J., concurring in part). The Puerto Ricans were classified with the blacks as "non-
whites," id. at 150 n.5 (White, J.), and thus were treated as if they benefited from the plan.
This exemplifies a potential problem of affirmative action programs: they may tend to bene-
fit primarily the most vocal and politically powerful of the minority groups. If the courts are
not sensitive to this problem, po one will be.
11 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (leaders from minority groups may act
out of prejudice towards their own group).
7- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
likely ever to be undone, 7 9 the courts have recognized that a key
aspect of invidious discrimination is its tendency to stigmatize per-
sons of particular groups. This stigma may take the form of stamp-
ing the group as inferior, venal, weak, or whatever, depending on
the popular prejudice and the nature of the discrimination. Any
evaluation of the legality of an affirmative action plan must in-
clude a serious search for a stigmatizing purpose or effect, for
"[s]tate programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the effects of
past racial discrimination obviously create the same hazard of
stigma, since they may promote racial separatism and reinforce the
views of those who believe that members of racial minorities are
inherently incapable of succeeding on their own."," Any affirmative
action program that would label a class of persons as innately in-
ferior should therefore be struck down.
That the Supreme Court has been misled on the subject of
stigma can be seen in the gender-based discrimination cases such
as Kahn v. Shevin.81 In Kahn, the Court upheld a statute granting
widows, but not widowers, a $500 property tax exemption, stating
that it was "reasonably designed to further the state policy of cush-
ioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which
that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. 8 2 Under the
circumstances, however, that ostensibly benign purpose was likely
predicated on the stereotype of the helpless and dependent widow.
As Justice White stated in dissent, "[t]he presumption is that all
widows are financially more needy and less trained or less ready for
the job market than men. 8 3 Such demeaning presumptions should
not be the basis for public policy. More hopeful was the later case
of Craig v. Boren,84 in which the Court struck down a law permit-
ting the sale of 3.2% beer to females, but not males, between the
ages of 18 and 21. The Court recognized that the law was predi-
cated on the "social stereotype" that young men are more likely to
be "reckless." '8 - Even when there may be some statistical evidence
" Id. at 494.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Is 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
'2 Id. at 355.
0 Id. at 360-61.
" 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
"1 429 U.S. at 202 n.14.
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tending to support such stereotypes, it is not permissible for the
state to reinforce them so as to perpetuate the stereotype."
I do not expect that many racial affirmative action programs
would be struck down on a theory of "stigma." Members of the
majority group are rarely if ever stigmatized by the existence of a
minority preference program: did anyone conclude on the basis of
Allan Bakke's rejection from medical school that whites are not
very intelligent? The more serious danger is that the minority,
which is apparently being helped by the program, may suffer be-
cause of an appearance that its members are unable to "make it"
on their own. Such challenges should be rejected, so long as the
programs are grounded in the need by minority group members for
special treatment to redress the effect of past discrimination. It is
not "stigmatizing" to need help for such a reason. And in the long
run, as blacks and members of other minority groups assume re-
sponsible positions in the economy and government, and display
their ample abilities to function effectively, the stigma of minority
status will tend to decline. The absence-not the presence-of af-
firmative action produces the true stigma, for it would perpetuate
the disadvantage of minority persons and the stereotypes that ac-
company it. Moreover, the courts should cast a skeptical eye on the
claims of white plaintiffs who seek to strike down a program be-
cause of an alleged stigmatizing effect on minority persons. Even if
they have standing in a technical sense to mount such a challenge,
their assertions on that score carry little weight. For an Allan
Bakke to win a place in medical school by purporting to defend the
interest of an uncomplaining and unidentified "stigmatized" mi-
nority person would be ironic. "What's Hecuba to -him or he to
Hecuba, [t]hat he should weep for her?"'
Does the program take away vested rights? In evaluating a
program that benefits certain persons at the expense of others, the
courts must inquire whether the vested rights of members of the
latter group are disturbed. Programs that take away the vested
rights of innocent persons-as opposed to those that affect only the
possibility of future benefits-may require a more substantial justi-
fication. I think this may explain the tension between such deci-
" "[Piroving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one
that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protec-
tion Clause." Id. at 204 (footnote omitted).
x7 W. SHAKESPaARE, HAMLET, II, 2, 562-63.
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sions as Weber" and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States.89 In Teamsters, the Supreme Court held illegal
under Title VII a remedy granting retroactive seniority rights to
black workers who had been discriminated against prior to enact-
ment of Title VII. In Weber, the Court approved a plan admitting
less senior blacks into a job training program ahead of more senior
whites, thereby diluting the value of the whites' seniority rights. In
Teamsters, the retroactive seniority would have denied the white
workers the benefits of seniority that they already had, and thus
would have disrupted their settled expectations.'" In Weber, on the
other hand, the white workers never had any right or expectation to
be admitted into the job training programs, because prior to the
adoption of the affirmative action plan, all of Kaiser's skilled
craftsmen were hired from outside the plant. Thus, Brian Weber
himself was better off after adoption of the challenged plan than he
was before: now he has at least some chance of receiving the train-
ing, whereas before" he had none.'
Often, employers and other persons in authority attempt to re-
allocate the vested rights of innocent persons in order to cover their
own misdeeds. The courts should insist where possible that affirm-
ative remedies be at the expense of the wrongdoer, rather than at
the expense of innocent bystanders. Back-pay remedies, special
training, damages, and the like place the onus for correcting past
injustice on the employer-perpetrator rather than on the innocent
employee, and should therefore be preferred. Of course, where the
employees had participated in the past instances of discrimination,
it matters little whether their settled expectations are defeated; we
should apply the traditional rule of justice that a person should not
" United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
" 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" But cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (holding that an award of
retroactive seniority is an appropriate remedy for racial discrimination occurring after pas-
sage of Title VII). Franks serves as a reminder that even the established seniority rights of
innocent persons may sometimes be disturbed if the public interest is sufficiently compel-
ling. As the Court noted, denying retroactive seniority to victims of discriminatory hiring
would completely "frustrate the central 'make whole' objective of Title VII." Id. at 774. And
"employee expectations arising from a seniority system agreement may be modified by stat-
utes furthering a strong public policy interest." Id. at 778 (footnote omitted).
"1 Both the majority and the concurring opinions in Weber stress this point. See 443
U.S. at 208 (Brennan, J.) ("At the same time, the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the white employees."); id. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Here, seniority is
not in issue because the craft training program is new and does not involve an abrogation of
pre-existing seniority rights.").
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profit from his own misdeeds. Yet, when essentially innocent per-
sons are asked to bear the brunt of remedying injury inflicted by
someone else, or by society as a whole, the courts should attempt to
protect their interest, so far as it is consistent with justice.12
Most affirmative action plans do not disturb vested rights, and
thus do not require this special degree of justification. Affirmative
hiring goals, preferential admissions processes, minority con-
tracting provisions, and the like only affect the opportunities for
future benefits. Important as these opportunities may be, their ad-
justment for the purpose of promoting racial equality is ultimately
not as serious as the reallocation of vested rights.
Is the program reasonably designed to achieve a remedial pur-
pose articulated by the decisionmaker? Perhaps the most impor-
tant mode of analysis the courts may employ to determine whether
a race-conscious remedial program is legal or constitutional is to
insist that the purpose of the program be articulated, and that the
program be reasonably designed to accomplish that purpose. The
Brennan group in Bakke said that to justify a racial classification
established for ostensibly benign reasons, "an important and ar-
ticulated purpose for its use must be shown."93 We need not in-
dulge in the largely meaningless quest for a verbal formulation that
expresses the appropriate level of "scrutiny" to be applied in such
cases: both the Brennan group and Justice Powell appeared in fact
to employ ends-means scrutiny stricter than that applied to eco-
nomic legislation, but less strict than that applied to invidiously
92 One commentator has criticized the view that some persons are innocent of racial
discrimination, and that discrimination can be attributed to particular deeds of particular
actors, calling this the "perpetrator perspective." Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimina-
tion Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978). To a certain extent,, this criticism is valid. In a society where
racial discrimination has been so pervasive, most white persons have both contributed to
and benefited from discrimination to some degree. I cannot agree, however, that we should
abandon the view that discriminatory acts are unjust and immoral, and that the wrongdoers
should bear the consequences of their misdeeds. To place the blame generally on social insti-
tutions relieves us all, individually, of responsibility, and it postpones the achievement of
racial justice until the coming of a new social, political, and economic order that may not
prove desirable. I believe that racial equality is demanded by our liberal democratic system
as it is now, and I hope that it can be attained without abandoning the fundamental struc-
ture of that system. Even within our present system, moreover, a nonperpetrator who has
been unjustly enriched in an ascertainable way by discrimination may have to contribute
to remedying the injury from such discrimination. See note 90 supra.
" Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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discriminatory legislation." This seems sensible: given the long his-
tory of misuse of racial classifications in this country, the variety of
abuses that have occurred, and the danger to our democratic insti-
tutions inherent in governance by race, the courts cannot abdicate
to the political branches their responsibility to enforce the equal
protection clause, even when a challenged discrimination is pur-
portedly "benign." But to treat efforts to remedy past injustice
with the same disfavor as we treat invidious discrimination itself
would be equally improper. A middle level of scrutiny, therefore,
seems best.
The reasonableness of the racial classification may be judged
from the viewpoint of whether it is overinclusive or underinclusive.
For example, if the purpose of the program is to help persons from
deprived backgrounds, we must ask whether the persons ad-
vantaged by the program in fact come from such backgrounds, and
whether the persons disadvantaged by it come from an affluent
background. Moreover, we must ask whether other persons, equally
or more deprived than those of the preferred class, have been ex-
cluded from the program. The danger is ever-present that affirma-
tive action programs will be set up for the benefit of only the
strongest and most politically powerful of the minority groups.
Similarly, if the purpose of the program is to promote cultural
diversity at a university, we must inquire whether inclusion of the
preferred ethnic groups particularly promotes such diversity or
whether preferment of other groups might do so as well or better. If
the purpose of the program is to correct for errors in the testing
process, we must ask whether the correction to the applicants'
scores bears a relation to the groups' differences in testing accu-
racy. The courts need not engage in these inquiries de novo, but
should ensure that the decisionmakers acted reasonably and
conscientiously.
The principal result of this inquiry probably will not be to
strike down many affirmative action programs. Rather, once the
courts begin to scrutinize programs in this way, the universities,
" The Brennan group did so explicitly. See id. at 361-62. Although Justice Powell pur-
ported to employ "strict scrutiny," see id. at 305, he concluded that the promotion of diver-
sity in education is a sufficiently compelling governmental objective, and that an admissions
program that deems minority status a "plus" can be considered necessary to achieve that
objective, id. at 315-19. This approach obviously falls shy of the "fatal in fact" scrutiny
usually called "strict." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
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governments, and employers of this country should respond by be-
ing more careful in the design of their affirmative action programs.
Instead of designing them to placate the demands of the most vocal
and powerful of the minorities, they may seek to assist those per-
sons and groups most in need of help. A serious ends-means analy-
sis by the courts should promote more rational decisions by other
institutions.
What other characteristics are used as criteria for selection?
Much of the opposition to affirmative action programs is based on
the view that such programs displace persons of more ability in
favor of persons of less ability, with race as the determining factor.
This opposition carries great weight, because in our meritocratic
society, we believe that persons should advance on the basis of
their ability and effort, both as a matter of efficiency and as a mat-
ter of justice. The American dream of equal opportunity is that all
arbitrary barriers to advancement on the basis of personal worth
can be eliminated, to the benefit of us all.
Affirmative action is not necessarily in conflict with this ideal,
for two reasons. First, for many decisions, ability is not the sole or
the principal criterion. Entrance to competitive universities may
serve as an example. The number of qualified applicants to most
such schools far exceeds the number of places available. To select
among the pool of qualified applicants, the schools may use a vari-
ety of criteria: geographic balance, diversity of experience, relation-
ship to alumni, athletic talent, sincerity or friendliness during an
interview, or whatever. What is lost when membership in a disad-
vantaged race is added to such a list of factors? So long as mem-
bers of the minority groups given preferential treatment possess the
qualifications reasonably necessary to profit from education at the
school, then their selection is no more arbitrary or invidious than is
the selection of the son or daughter of a distinguished alumnus.
Second, in many contexts, "ability" is difficult, perhaps im-
possible, to define. Quantitative scores, such as standardized test
results or grades, may not by themselves be reliable indicators of
future success. 5 The meritocratic ideal does not mean that the per-
son predicted to be the most worthy on the basis of incomplete or
possibly faulty information deserves to advance the farthest;
rather, it means that every person is entitled to the opportunity to
attain the highest result he can, given his talents, dedication, and
11 See Sexton, supra note 45, at 324-27, 333-34.
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luck. A minority person admitted to a law school receives only the
chance to make it in his profession. He is subjected to the same
academic requirements, must pass the same tests, must attract the
same clients, must win the same cases, as his white fellow class-
mates. His success in those endeavors is the true mark of his abil-
ity, not his LSAT scores and college grades. Unfortunately, the his-
tory of discrimination in this country has distorted the indicators of
ability for persons of disadvantaged groups; now, special recogni-
tion of that distortion is needed so that genuine meritocratic selec-
tion can proceed fairly.
These considerations suggest that courts should consider what
other characteristics are used as criteria for selection. If race is
used as a supplement to other arbitrary, non-ability-related crite-
ria, then there is little reason to object to it. Even if race is consid-
ered along with predictors of ability, the courts should be aware
that such predictors may operate unfairly, and that a genuine com-
mitment to equality of opportunity is often consistent with at least
some consideration of race.
Are all applicants for the privilege granted equivalent proced-
ural treatment? Behind the semantic dispute over the difference
between "quotas" and "goals" is a fundamental point about pro-
cedural fairness: there is a difference between a system that ac-
cords members of a minority group an advantage in an otherwise
competitive process, and a system that removes certain positions
or privileges from competition altogether. As Justice Powell saw
the preferential admissions program at the University of California
at Davis, its "principal evil" was the denial to Allan Bakke of his
"right to individualized consideration without regard to his race." 7
It is appropriate for the courts to insist, as Justice Powell did in
Bakke, that an affirmative action program guarantee to all appli-
cants the right to compete-even as it recognizes the legitimacy of
using race as one criterion for decision.
In his dissent from that portion of Justice Powell's Bakke opin-
ion, Justice Brennan rejected the suggestion that there is a consti-
tutional distinction between "adding a set number of points to the
admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an ex-
pression of the preference . . . and setting a fixed number of places
See generally Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or
Structural Justice?, 92 HARv. L. REv. 864, 867-73 (1979).
" Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978).
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for such applicants."98 He insisted that the excluded white appli-
cant under the fixed-quota system "receives no more or less 'indi-
vidualized cnsideration' " than under Justice Powell's preferred
alternative." It cannot be denied, however, that Allan Bakke re-
ceived no consideration at all for the sixteen reserved minority slots
at the Davis medical school; nor can it be denied that this differ-
ence seems important. It is the difference between process and re-
sult, akin to the requirement of a hearing independent of the pros-
pect of eventual success on the merits. We may therefore expect
that in the post-Bakke world, the question whether applicants are
accorded equivalent procedural treatment, or whether certain ap-
plicants are eliminated en masse, may determine the permissibility
of the program.
Is the program temporary or permanent? It may seem a simple
point, but an affirmative action program that will terminate is
more defensible than one that may persist in perpetuity. Since af-
firmative action is principally designed to provide temporary assis-
tance now that will enable minority group members to compete on
an equal basis in the future, such a program will appear better
suited to its ends if it is scheduled to end upon achievement of the
intended outcome. Moreover, members of the public are more
likely to cooperate with a plan that they see as temporary: part of
the opposition to affirmative action can be understood as arising
from the fear that whites are to be subject to disadvantage for all
time. The demands by minority group members for redress would
surely be treated with greater sympathy if the majority were as-
sured that the need for affirmative action will end in the conceiv-
able future.
This is one reason why the hiring program at issue in Weber
was particularly meritorious. As Justice Blackmun noted in his
concurring opinion, Kaiser Aluminum's affirmative action plan was
"a moderate one":
[I]t ends when the racial composition of Kaiser's craftwork
force matches the racial composition of the local population. It
thus operates as a temporary tool for remedying past discrimi-
nation without attempting to "maintain" a previously
achieved balance. . . . Because the duration of the program is
"Id. at 378 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
,1Id. at 378 n.63.
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finite, it perhaps will end even before the "stage of maturity
when action along this line is no longer necessary."''0
CONCLUSION
Affirmative action programs are now firmly entrenched in our
public law as a means of eradicating the gross disparities in oppor-
tunity between the white majority and the nonwhite minorities.
Recent decisions upholding affirmative action still receive strident
criticism. But the permissibility-the necessity-of race-conscious
remedies did not begin with Weber or Bakke, but was impliedly
established at least by the time of Griggs and Swann.'0' Indeed,
such remedies are the necessary result of this nation's belated deci-
sion to cease its course of racial discrimination in favor of a regime
of equality among the races. That principle, in turn, can be traced
to the Civil War, and still farther to the Founding itself. The task
now is not to justify remedies for the centuries of oppression of
blacks by whites, but rather to ensure that the remedies we choose
will create a nation of genuine equality in the future. For who are
we to accept the bounty that this country presents us, if we do not
seek to share that bounty with our fellow citizens?
It is time for the legal community to stop its squabbling: to
admit that the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act permit us to
remedy the wrongs of the past. It is time to abandon the abstrac-
tions of "color-blind" theory and admit that there can be no such
thing as a "color-blind" approach to achieving racial equality. It is
time now to concentrate our efforts on ensuring that the remedies
we construct are humane and effective, that they respect, so much
as is possible, the rights of all. Most important, we must be sure
that-for the first time in history-we do the job right, so that suc-
ceeding generations will not still be faced with the odious sight of
institutionalized racial injustice.
I" United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403). See also id. at 208 (Brennan, J.) ("Moreover, the plan is a temporary
measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest
racial imbalance.").
"I Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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